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                尼克松首席翻譯傅立民(Chas W. Freeman, Jr.):美國在把中國逼成敵人

                美國前駐華公使、尼克』松訪華時美方首席翻譯傅立民(Chas W. Freeman, Jr.)在其個人主頁發表了2019613日在布朗大學外交政策協會百年紀念講座上的發言稿:《中美脫鉤及其影響》

                Chas Freeman???? :周枝萍

                我們美國人正在費盡心思△地制造排外情緒。如今每天都有土行孫消息傳來,部分美國民眾間歇性的本土主義情緒爆發實在令人感到尷尬。當代美國人對這個世界本來就十分無知,再加上社交媒體和非主流小報的胡亂揣測、臆想和幻覺,問題就更加嚴重。在這些被編出來的故事裏,主角多半是中國,當然還有俄羅斯、伊朗『和古巴等另外幾個“邪惡國家”,而且據說上述幾國的影響力最近都已進入委內瑞拉這個距美國南小唯跟何林也慢慢部海岸1600英裏之遙的蹩腳“社會主義國家”了。

                委內瑞拉⊙出美女,這是世人皆知的,然而除非我們的軍隊主動打過去,否則這個國家並沒有資格成為美國的敵人。不過,我們美國人最終還是在中國那竟然也是水之力裏找到了解藥,身患“敵人缺乏綜合癥”(enemy deprivation syndrome)的美國軍工復合體終於還是這消息網自然不會弱有救了。

                由於前蘇聯出人意料地舉手投降,美國軍工復合而后嘖嘖贊道體不僅失去了“魔鬼般”的對手,也失去了充裕的資金和良好的狀態。蘇聯雖然倒下了,可中國又頂上來了!真是感謝上帝,快把彈藥給我們吧!對了,還有錢,否則這點彈藥怎麽夠用呢?

                然而,令人遺憾的是,莫斯科在與華盛頓之間的冷戰中意外出局並不能為直接跳了下去我們預測美中對抗的結果提供任何可靠的參考。只和一個共產黨國家打過交道並不能說明你就了解了所有的共產黨國家。與俄式的馬克思列寧主義不同,東亞的“市場列寧主義”卓有成效。中國不但無論誰也救不了你沒有解體,反而持續不斷地在經濟和國家實力上提升自己◣在世界上的地位。美國在制定政策時,似乎只有國防預算隨著中國崛起相應提高,卻沒有優先考慮美國的公司、消費者和技術那鶴王能夠活著專家。

                歐洲人、美國人和日本人曾在19世紀和20世紀初讓中國人嘗到了屈辱的滋味,雖然現在沒人能轟夠確定中國將以多快的速度或冷光一愣多穩的步伐崛起,但中國似乎註定會重新奪回它曾保持了數千年的領先地位。這意看看這仙府是不是有什么寶庫味著美國已經保持了140年之久的全球最大經濟體的地位將落入中國人的手中。失去“第一”光環的美國將不得不與中直直國以及其他曾受西方壓迫的國家一又變成了之前那妖異道分享權力。

                中國人的確做過一些令美國人反感的事,比如他們在知識產權領域的一些做法。然而正如哥倫比亞大學歷史學者斯蒂芬·韋特海姆(Stephen Wertheim)所但現在看來說的那樣:“美國在過去一年裏出現的反華浪潮,更多地是由美國人自身的焦慮情緒,而不是中國人的所作々所為導致的”。退一步說,美國政治中的民粹主義對美國恐華癥爆發所起的作用,至少與中國“不良行為”所起的作用是不相上下的。

                在美國,富裕的精英階層執掌著能夠左右美國經濟命脈的銀行和大公司,而許多美國人∞感覺自己一直在受到那些精英的】輕侮。當前美國社會流動性陷入停滯,財霸王之力不斷涌入領域之中富集中在“百分之一”的人手中,民眾生活水平不見提高甚至出現了下滑,企業高管和金融精英中飽私囊達到駭人聽聞的程度,此類現象讓來自不同種族背景的美國人痛恨不自大已。他們指責那些精英把收卐入不錯的制造業工業崗位轉移到了海外。

                歐洲裔的美國中下階層民眾認為近年來的美國領導人看上去和他們不一樣,因此特別擔心自己淪為少數群體。美國的政治正確致力於保護形形色色的美國人免遭無心冒犯,唯獨不照顧中下層白人和他們的信仰,甚至將他們貶冷然一笑損為“可憐蟲”(譯註:希拉裏·克林頓稱特朗普的支持者一半都是“可憐蟲”),這一切讓他們怒火中燒。他們很容易受到輿論的蠱惑,認為自己的痛苦是只顧私利的美●國公司與中國勾結造成的結果。把責任推給中國的確有助於緩和他們的負面情緒。然而令人遺憾的是,這並不能從根本上解決問題。

                美國國內問題重重,再加上國際威望日益下降,這些都對美國民眾的心理造成了嚴重的壓力。當下這種情況是對美國人的韌性、務實精神和意誌力的一場考︼驗。我們知道,我們必須改革和調整稅收政策、投資政策、勞資關系和教育政策來使這個國家振作起來。

                有些人沒有選擇應對現狀,而是選擇了反抗現狀,他們堅持認為這種挑戰是對美國的威脅。在他們的想象裏,中國一定十分渴望像二戰後的美國那樣去主宰世界。然而當你花時間傾聽中神色國人對內談論他們的抱負時,你會發現他們想要的是尊重,是讓曾經看不起他們的外國人能夠懂點禮貌。今天的中國人和他們的祖先一樣,所要求的都是一種威嚴的地位,讓其他國家不敢造次,使中國得以在安寧的∩環境中走向繁榮。

                面對中國的要求,美國顯得有些無所適從,隨著中國化龍池變得越來越富強,它不再向美國的地區和全球霸權低頭。中國人不再寶貝認為卑躬屈膝來換取悶聲發大財的機會是值得的。而美國似乎鐵了心要¤維持自己的超然地位——不是通過改正自身的問題,而是通過給中國下絆子、上鐐銬——但是這份偏可不知為什么會被道皇知道執和自滿是無濟於事的。美國一面在要求中國更加開放的同時,自己卻日益走向封閉。

                這種變化可不是什麽好兆√頭。無論是美國放過中國,還是美國通過削弱中國來保全自己的全球主導地位就為了殺你而已,這兩者成為現實的可能性都微乎其微。試圖打倒中國更有可能削弱和拖垮美國經濟,而不會阻止中國的前進。那麽,未來的美中關系會是什麽樣呢?

                首先,我要╳對傑裏米·哈夫特(譯註:Jeremy R. Haft,美國企業家、暢銷書作家那你們、學者、對華貿易事務媒體評論員)2019年為“偉大決策”計劃所寫文章中提到的關鍵一點表示贊同。他指出,拿不同國家的GDP作比較等於是把蘋果和橘子一起作比較,其結果不足以反映國際競爭的真實情況。GDP完全沒有反映出經濟活動的國際分工。如果我們把挖溝的工人或推卸責臉色頓時變了任的金融工程師帶來的價值增量,與鋼鐵工人或諾貝爾獎得主為國家資本帶來的增量混為一談,那麽我們便忽略了非常重要的信息。GDP作為一種指數,用處在於以我之名讓我們知道一個國家經濟總體規模有多大,增長速度有多快,但它基本不能少主是想先把他找過來——甚至完全不這三級仙帝硬是咬著牙能——幫我們預測國與國之間競爭的結果。

                雖然不能說經濟總量無關緊要,不過一個國不知道你這個七級仙帝家的精神、自豪感、意誌和耐力才是決定經濟總量能發揮怎樣作用的關鍵因①素。1941年12月7日,日本偷襲珍珠港試圖削弱美國在太平洋的軍事力量見水元波如此鄭重其事時,其GDP規模僅為美國的十分之一。然而日本卻牽制了美國將近四年,最終也只是因為缺乏發動核反擊的能力才宣告投降。

                因此,無論是按名義匯率計算還是按購買力平價標準計算,比較中美兩國的經濟總量指標都沒有切中問題的關鍵。中國的工業產值現在占全球的四分之一, 比美國的1.5倍還多,甚至超過雷公眼中精光閃爍美國、德國、韓國工業產值的總和,這一點地步才是更加重要的。此外,在中國從事科學、技術、工程和數學類工作的勞動者已經占到了全世界同類勞動者總數的自己人四分之一,是美國的八倍,而且從業人員數量↙的增長速度也是美國的三倍以上,這一點同樣是非常重要的。

                與美◥國和蘇聯不同,中國在意識形態上沒有充當救世主的欲望,這可能會成為它的一大優勢。如果有東嵐星其他國家試圖模仿中國的制度,中國人自然覺得臉上有光;但其實中國人並不介意其他國家內部如何治理。中國在其國內施行的是一黨執政的制度。盡管美國的意∑識形態旗手宣稱中國在海外推廣專制、反對民主,但其實中國並沒有這樣冰冷做。

                在冷戰結束後秩序混亂的新世界裏,意識形態聯盟已經高度弱化,幾近蕩「然無存。一種政治體制有多受歡迎,幾乎完全取決於它能在多大程度上帶來⌒有效的領導、繁榮的經濟、安寧的社會。你無法再強迫小國向大國效忠。各國可以自由選擇→國際夥伴和競爭對手,並就事論事地與它們打交道。

                中國的財富和實力與日俱增,鄰國們無不擔憂自己將不得不順從中國,然而沒有哪個國家真的擔心中國入侵。盡管美國費勁心思地去設想東亞海域出你現一個類似富爾達缺口(譯註:冷戰期間,富爾達這座城市靠近東德和西德的分界線,該地一處山谷被命名為“富爾達缺口”,美國認為若戰爭爆發,富爾達缺口最有可能遭受蘇軍進攻)的地方,但實∑ 際上東亞並不存在“富爾達缺口”。一些美嗡國人兜售的那套過分誇大的“中國威脅論”在國內比在國外更加受到歡迎。即使在那些早◢就對中國有戒備心理的國家,美國的這套說辭也沒有產生很強的吸引力,也許是因為那些國家看不到迫於美國壓力在美中之間選邊站隊能為自己帶來什麽好處,反而很可能損失巨大。美國指望靠危言聳聽來沖淡中國的正面宣傳,這根本算不上都難以看清這里面發生了什么什麽外交。

                中國是其所有鄰國最大的貿易夥伴。中國正在成為這些醉無情冰冷國家最大的外資來源地和投資目的地。對這些國家來說,中國近在咫尺,而且永遠也不會離開。這些國家不想在中國面前惹事生非,也不會跟美國他們和小唯已經動過手了一道挑釁中國。

                中國數百年來一直對分布在東海和南海的島嶼、礁石和島礁提出主權聲索。只是由於冷戰期間中國受美國遏制,其他主天空權聲索國才趁機占領了大部分島礁。直到30年前,中國才占領了其他聲索國∏尚未占領的少數地貌。

                中國在馬來西亞、菲律賓和越南的周邊構築據點來建立固定存在,但這些國家並不尋求把中國趕走。盡♂管中國同美國海軍在如何劃定領海基線方面存在分奇怪歧,但它並未威脅到南海商貿航呼行的自由。畢竟,該海域三分之二的過往船舶要麽來自中國,要麽駛向中國。若不是美國媒♀體利用失之偏頗的言論來混淆視聽,這些事實可謂顯而易見。

                目前,中國只要求鄰國以禮相待、互相開放貿易和投資,不與第三方合謀威脅中國安全,除此之外並不索要什麽☆其他的東西。無論這些鄰國過而后不敢置信去是不是美國的盟友,它們現在都沒有加入美國陣營來孤立中國。它們之所以尋求獲得美國的支持,目的不是為了與中國對抗,而是希望借助美國的力量』尋求與中國之間保持一種平衡通靈寶殿二寶殿應該答應給你某種東西的、可持續的和解狀態。

                這種目標上的不一致,就解釋了為什麽特朗普政府排斥中國的行動迄今對中國的損害還不如對美國與盟友和國際夥伴之間的關系損害大。這些行動非但沒有削弱中國的影響力,反而破壞了美國的領導地位。

                在雙邊層面上⌒,當前美國發起的貿易戰已經讓中國經濟付出了↙代價。中國的反擊對美國也造正要追殺過去成了同樣的影響。等待美國零售企業和消費者的是逐步升級的沖擊。特朗普貿易戰的短期影響是顯而易見的。那麽它的長期影響又是什麽【呢?

                首先,供應鏈和貿易模式遭到永久性脫節。具有諷刺意味至尊神山的是,當中國生產商為了避免美國關稅而轉投東南我也不知道你龍族亞、東非和拉№丁美洲的時候,他們在國內價值鏈上的地位得到了提升。與此同時,加大對其他國眾多龍頭和之法家的生產投資促進了中國在當地的影響力。俄羅斯、烏克蘭和其他國家的農業當前獲得了蓬勃發使得對方已經沒什么戰斗力展,這都是以犧牲美國農民利益為代價換來的結果。

                美國已然向中國證明了自己是一個善變的、不可靠的貿易夥伴。這使得中國人麒麟緩緩開口有充分的理由去購買其他國家的產品卐◤。中國曾經是美國增長最快的出口市場。華盛頓方面在試圖限制中國資本流入美國之時,也在破壞自己的對可還有我呢華出口。

                由於中國公司基本不能用賺來的美元直接在美國投資,中國政府以前一直用這些外匯購買美國國債,從而補貼了美國政府的財政赤字,使它可以靠信貸轉期來避免政府關門。本來,中國企業在美國基礎設施、工業和農業領域的投資有可能創造就業和出口,結果卻只能被動地為美國財政的揮霍買單。而時至今日,中美關系轉向對立甚至導致這種共生關系也陷入了危機。如果像某些人預測的那●樣,中國將成為一個凈資本流而是越牢固越好入國而不是流出國,它也將在全球範圍銷售債務,直接與美國競爭。

                撇開中國為美國預算赤字融資不談,單說阻止中云星主國投資美國私營企業給美國經濟造成了怎樣的機會成本。以日本為例,日本是美國的盟友,但上世紀80年代,日本公司在美國投資面臨著相似的困境,盡管沒有這麽嚴重。與反對中國投資一樣,當年反對日本投資的人也提出了一些莫須有的國家安全考量。但是,在日本流入美國的資金減少之前,日本為美國創造了70萬個就業崗位,並在美國建立了許多工廠,每年為美國創造了超過600億美元的出口額。中國資金Ψ 本來可以發揮同樣作用,卻由於行政命令和國會法案的出臺而搖了搖頭被導向其他地方。美國的損失成全了他人坐收漁翁之利。

                美國給中國公司投資設置了極高的障礙,這種做法對美國經濟的影背上風雷之翅振動響不難估測。長期以來,美國每年吸引了大約全球15%的對外直☉接投資(FDI)。15年前,中國的對美投資也差不多占了其對外投資總額的15%。但是,隨著華盛頓方面提高了中國參與美國經濟的門檻看著金烈,這一比例已經下降到中國對外直接投資總額的2%左右。同期,中國對歐洲的投資已經上升到中國對外直接投資總額的30%多。

                如果我們沒有禁止中這里真國公司投資美國,這些中國公司每年將會拿出800億美元用於擴大美國私營部門,這將為美國創造大量就業崗位。如今中國不再將儲蓄交給我們,我們美國人也就得不到這筆錢。如此一來我們就只能指望美國自身儲蓄∴率的提高了。

                特朗普-彭斯政府的仇外心理也提醒我們,科學技術轟的進步需要各國之間加強合作,沒有國家能夠閉門造車。在美國,我們每年大約∞有65萬從事科學和工程專業的學生畢此時此刻業,其中超過三分之一是外國人。在某些學科,如工程學和計算機科學,新頒發學位的一半給了外國學生。在人工智能領域,這個比例達到你們去整合你們60%。美國近三分之一的外國學生來自中國。如果我們像特朗普-彭斯政府威脅的那樣排擠中國人,那麽中國人就不會來到美國與我們一起工作。

                如今,中國每『年有180萬畢業生從事科學、技術、工程和數學領域的工作。中國在這些領域授予的博士學位數量即將超過我們。從2016年到2017年,中國的知識產權價值增長了19%,而美國僅增長了10%。目前誰在科學、技術、工程和數學方面的發展勢頭更加強勁是顯而易見的。

                到2025年,中國所擁有的熟練技術工人的數量預計將超過經合組織所有成員國的總和。通過與中國脫不斷劈下鉤,我們美國人正在疏遠這個世界上科學家、技術專家、工程師和數學家數量最多的國家。中國企業在研發方面的支出正以每年20%的速度增長,遠遠超m 過其他任何國家。切斷中美科技交流與其說會阻礙中國的進步,倒不如說似乎更將損害美國的≡創新力。

                中美關系走向分裂是特朗普政府一手策劃的,其潛在影響除了我在上文中提到的以外還有很多。最後,我將簡要地再闡述一些此類內容以供大家思考:

                1我們目前在中國南海問題上無異於同中國傷口滴落到那匕首之上玩誰是懦夫的遊戲。在美方的支持下,日本正在中國東海的釣魚島發起同樣的挑釁行動。我們距離與中國爆發話海戰只有一步之遙。如果戰爭爆發,這將是我們自1945年以來的第一隨后頓時大喜次海上沖突,也是我們第一次與擁核國家發生沖突。

                2中國內戰1950年因美國第七艦隊駛進臺灣海峽而宣告停火,但是這並不意味著內戰已經結束。現在我們的政策似乎正促使臺灣的一些政客認為他們手持一張空白支票,隨時能重新發動內戰。與此同時,我們與中國人民解放軍之間的對話機制和我們在冷戰時期與蘇聯軍隊的對話機制無法相比。我們目前還沒有制定華盛頓與北京的危機管控機制。我們對中國的政治軍事戰略無非就是希望不要卷入戰爭。

                3 我們正與北京展開軍備競賽。中國最近測試了航母殺手彈道導彈、電磁炮、高超光芒音速滑翔彈頭、量子衛星通信系統、反隱身雷達以及射程空前的遠程反艦導彈和空地導彈等等,其中一些武器已經部署。我們未必能夠在這樣一場軍仙君以上備競賽中取勝。

                4同時,我們在太空領域與中國之間的競爭也已經開始。到目前為止,我們是龜兔賽跑中的兔子,中國是那只烏默契龜。當我們夢想著在火星上進行華麗的冒險時,中國正在為開采月球和一些小行星上的資源有條不紊地做著準備,以便能夠在地球和月球之間引力平衡的拉格朗日點建造駐留地和工廠。

                5我們正試圖摧毀中國大型科技企業,比如華為,我們希望將其排除在全球5G網絡之外。但是,即便美國不再對其提供一些則蘊含了無數雷霆之力技術支持,中國擁有龐大的國內市場,國際市場也亟需物美價廉的設備,借此契機,中國的科技巨頭他這樣大范圍搜索將有能力在美國境外主宰這個世界。

                6中國原本想利用國家管理的局域網來分割美國管控的全球互聯網世界,美國並不想互聯網世界遭到分割。然而多虧了美國的民族主義和對網絡安全隱私的偏執,北京現在實現了他的目的,數字世界正在遭到不同網絡主權的分割。

                不管特朗普總々統會不會像他承諾的那樣,讓美眼珠一轉國再次偉大起來。至少目前為止,他沒有達成交易,而是破壞了交易;他沒有擴大美國的國際影響力,反而削弱了美國的國際影響力。我贊同互通有無的自由貿易觀點,不要想著什麽都自己造。但沒有人能否認,總統及其追隨者們正在從根強壓著內心本上改變他所接手的這個世界。許多外國人現在都認為美國是一個流氓超為什么不攻擊他級大國,鐵了心要摧毀前幾代美國人辛辛苦苦創造的恐怕任誰都無法忽略世界秩序。中美關系的脫■鉤是造成全球政治和科技動蕩最重要的原因之一,但它氣勢絕非唯一的原因。

                幾十年前,哈佛大學教授約瑟夫·奈(Joseph Nye)指出,如果美國將中國視為敵人,那麽中國就會變成美國的敵人。現在事實證明他的觀點是完全正確的。歡迎來到21世紀,在這個附庸龍族世紀裏,全球治理的工你沒感覺錯具正越來越多地從美國手中流失,大國之間的競爭變得越來越激烈,美國的同盟正在瓦解,美國爭取其他國家合作的能力正在下降。盡管美國擁有無與倫比的軍事力量,但美國並不具備明確的策略來遏制或扭轉這些趨勢。

                所有這些對美國人來說都是不可接受的:比如不經審慎的戰略思考,半夜荷爾蒙飆升就開始推特治國;比如放棄國與國之間的相互妥協和交易,試圖通過軍國主義、貿易制裁以及蠻橫無理的人全部殺死了要求來達成目的;比如對外交往過程中全然喪失禮節,盡是威脅、侮辱和謾罵。這些做法並沒有取得任何效果。

                中國是世界上畢竟你們如今實力最強的崛起中大國,美國東嵐星最大的失敗在於沒有處理好與中國的關系。我們當前的做法不但不能說服中國為了共同利益改變我們不喜歡的政策和做法,無助於解決問題,反而會使問題變得四面八方都是更加棘手。兩國之間的友誼正在迅速蛻變成敵意。

                為了能夠有效地與中國這樣的崛起大國以及俄實力遠遠沒有完全發揮羅斯這樣的復興大國競爭,為了能夠帶著我們國家一直以來所體現的自信和樂觀態度去競爭,我們不僅必須修正我們的外交政策,我們還必須修正當下正在分裂我們、削弱我們的國內政策。歷史證明,我們的憲政民主可以保障變革有序地進行。為了調動美國人民的巨大的才智和精力來應對我國目前面臨的前所未有的挑戰,我們必須適應新的國內和國際現實。我們曾經做到過,我們現在也可以做到。

                Sino-American Interactions, Past and Future

                A Paper Prepared for a January 2019 Conference at the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia

                Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.) Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University

                December 15, 2018[1] will mark the fortieth anniversary of Jimmy Carter’s and Deng Xiaoping’s politically courageous agreement to “normalize” the relationship between Washington and Beijing.[2]? This resulted in the replacement of China’s demand for revolutionary overthrow of the world order with pragmatic accommodation of it.[3]? Two days later, at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),[4] Deng launched China on a path of eclectic borrowing of foreign ideas, policies, and practices called “reform and opening” [改革開放].? This liberated the Chinese people – who were then almost a fourth of humanity – from the most suffocating aspects of Soviet Marxist-Leninist dogma and released their formidable entrepreneurial imaginations and energies.

                The consequences of Deng’s twin decisions for both China and the world have been immense.? He saw US-China normalization and “reform and opening” as parts of a single bold gamble with his country’s future.? ?His vision enabled China to risk a search for inspiration in America and other capitalist democracies, to which the Chinese elite promptly entrusted its sons and daughters for education.

                “Dengism” reinvigorated China’s political economy by progressively abandoning major elements of its Soviet-derived model of central planning, state monopolization of commerce and industry, and collectivized agriculture.? The results were explosive economic growth amidst rocketing living standards, the rebirth of Chinese science and technology, the emergence of a Sino-centric regional order in East Asia, and the debut of China as a major actor on the global stage.? American policy had aimed only at altering China’s external relationships and behavior.? The tremendous changes inside China were a welcome but entirely unexpected bonus.

                Contemporary China is the improbable child of neo-Confucian Leninism and the Pax Americana.? ??The defining characteristics of the liberal global order crafted by the United States were a universal commitment to multilateral rule making, quasi-judicial dispute resolution, the progressive removal of tariffs and quotas as barriers to trade, open investment flows, some level of selfless development assistance, humanitarian relief, and the principle of PACTA SUNT SERVANDA.[5]? China has prospered in this international environment and remains comfortable in it.

                Despite oft-repeated accusations[6] that Beijing wants to do away with the rule-bound international order, China now seems far more committed to preserving it than its American progenitor.? Under the Trump administration, the United States has come to stand explicitly for mercantilist bilateralism and protectionism, economic coercion, an end to support for foreign economic development or refugees, and the unilateral abrogation of international agreements. ?By contrast, Chinese dissatisfaction with the international status quo has not been about its rules.? China, like many other emerging market economies, has complained about the inability of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (IBRD), World Trade Organization (WTO), and regional banks like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to expand their reach, funding, and inclusiveness.

                When legacy institutions have not risen to the challenges before them,[7] China has worked with others to create parallel structures.? American disquiet at seeing countries other than the United States like China emerge as rule-makers and institution-builders obscures but does not obviate the fact that the new Chinese-sponsored multilateral institutions have without exception cooperated with existing bodies and conformed to the norms and practices they espouse.? To the extent that U.S. China policy aimed at curbing China’s revolutionary zeal and incorporating it into the international system created by the Pax Americana, it has been and remains a success rivaled only by the integration of post-revolutionary France into the conservative order managed by the Concert of Europe.

                But, to the disappointment of na?ve American ideologues, as China modernized, it refused to participate in “the end of history” by embracing either democracy or laissez-faire economics as principles of governance.? Instead, Beijing remained stubbornly obsessed with the avoidance of anarchy through authoritarianism.? China shows no sign of abandoning the policy and investment-directed market economy that kindled and then sustained the ferocious competition between its enterprises (whether state or privately owned).? Entrepreneurship guided by preferential access to capital (rather the tax exemptions commonly used in the U.S.) continues to propel China toward technological innovation and ever greater wealth and power.

                Those Americans who criticized U.S. policies of engagement with Beijing as slighting efforts to democratize China and westernize its human rights and economic practices now cite the failure of engagement to meet their expectations as proof of policy failure.? But the success of policies can only be measured in terms of their objectives.? However much Americans may have hoped or expected that China would Americanize itself, U.S. policy was almost entirely aimed at changing China’s external behavior rather than its constitutional order.? The sole exception was the first fifteen months of the Clinton administration (1993-1994), when Washington attempted to coerce change in China by linking it to the terms of Chinese foreign trade.? When it became apparent that this approach was a dead end, Washington abandoned it,[8] never to resume it.

                Irreconcilable ideological contradictions between America and China still bedevil the relationship.? Chinese accept that foreigners govern themselves differently and should be left alone to do so.? Americans see any political system other than constitutional democracy as inherently illegitimate.? They will not accept moral equivalence with any authoritarian regime.? The U.S. has concluded that it must, in practice, deal with the CCP, but it does so as a politically awkward expedient, not as approval of the CCP’s legitimacy.

                As an added complication, “democratic peace theory” (a recent addition to American ideology) asserts that democracies don’t fight each other, while wars are – by implication – to be expected with nations of other political dispensations.? This hypothesis translates the absence of democracy in China into a potential menace to U.S. national security.[9]? This, in turn, provides a threat that is a welcome alternative to tiresome low-intensity conflicts in West Asia and North Africa.? It makes China a potential “peer competitor” that poses the sort of high-tech challenges to U.S. primacy that the U.S. military-industrial-congressional complex can profitably forfend.? Postulating a vague but dreadful menace from China is the latter-day equivalent of paranoia about the supposed “yellow peril.”? It transforms China’s modernization into a reliable driver of increased U.S. spending on complex new weapons systems.

                So ideological values are back as a source of conflict in Sino-American relations. But, by contrast with the Cold War, most of the world no longer sees the American system as self-evidently superior to its competitors.? And, unlike the USSR, which sought to export its model, China does not.? Instead, the CCP is on the ideological defensive, as its overwrought reactions to perceived challenges to its authority repeatedly demonstrate.? It espouses no ideology other than self-absorption and studied indifference to how other countries govern themselves.? In short, Sino-American rivalry does not fit the Cold War pattern.? It cannot be managed in the same manner as rivalry with the USSR.

                “Containment,” the American grand strategy proposed by George Kennan in 1947, assumed that, if the Soviet system were walled up by sanctions and defensive alliances, it would eventually collapse of its own defects.? That turned out to be correct, though it took forty-three years to prove it.? Such “containment” is irrelevant to any contest with China.[10]? The Soviet model exalted autarky.[11]? China has come to epitomize globalization and broad-based economic interdependence with other nations.? It cannot be isolated from a world order in which it is so thoroughly integrated and in which other countries increasingly look to it for leadership as well as shared prosperity.

                Nor is China’s economic system irrational, inflexible, enervated, or burdened by unsustainable levels of military spending, as the Soviet Union’s was.? China has no reason to reenact Moscow’s humiliating decision to default on its rivalry with Washington or to accept supervision by Wall Street bankers, carpet-bagging Harvard professors, or democracy promoters.? Both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras were so different from those of today that they provide no useful counsel for dealing with China’s very real challenges to American pride and primacy.

                Finally, in many parts of the world, this is an age of pessimism and contraction in the human spirit.? But in China, optimism is still in command.? Confidential polling reveals little of the destabilizing distrust in government in China that has seized so many parts of the West.? The Chinese people’s approval of their government and the directions in which it is taking their country is exceptionally high.? Chinese may not love the CCP, but very few think their country would be better off without it in charge.[12]? They can’t help contrasting the relatively effective performance of their government with what they, like others, see as devastating political incoherence and dysfunction in the contemporary United States.

                So, an obnoxious symmetry has come to pervert Sino-American relations.? Neither side shows much empathy in its approach to the other.? As it looks at its rival, each sees itself, attributing its own motivations and reasoning processes to the other.? Self-righteous American contempt for the legitimacy of the Chinese political system is more than matched by hubristic Chinese disdain for the incompetence of governance in the contemporary United States.? American politicians have become aggressively accusatory about China.? Chinese struggle to restrain comparably impolitic and counterproductive rhetoric about the United States.? These differences are a problem that is likely to persist until the United States gets back its groove, China suffers a sobering setback, or both.? Neither development seems imminent.

                It is said that Chinese plan in years, decades, and centuries, while Americans calculate what must be done in terms of weeks and months.? The Sino-American relationship, till now, has advanced by a series of U.S. finesses of Chinese grievances that left them to fester unresolved.? Taiwan is at the center of this pattern.

                Taiwan’s political relationship with the rest of China, now under the governance of the People’s Republic, remains in doubt.? In managing this issue, the United States has expediently evaded long-term strategic choices in exchange for short-term gains, while the CCP has made tactical compromises but held firm to its strategic goal of bringing Taiwan under its dominion. To Chinese nationalists, their inability to resolve the Taiwan question symbolizes their country’s ongoing humiliation by foreign interventions intended to divide and weaken it.? To the CCP, American protection of Taiwan represents insulting unwillingness by the world’s greatest power to respect the People’s Republic’s political legitimacy.

                The balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and adjacent areas continues to shift against the island and the United States, making the use of force by China and war between China and the United States both more plausible and more perilous.? The mainland’s political system is becoming less open. This has further reduced the appeal of peaceful reunification to the already skeptical citizens of Taiwan’s democracy.? The United States might still use its power to move the Taiwan issue toward resolution before Taiwan’s bargaining position is fatally weakened and China’s capabilities decisively outweigh those of the United States.? But, in practice, Washington has consistently chosen complacency over strategy.? Against ever worsening military and economic odds, Americans continue to prefer impasse to evolution in cross-Strait relations.

                This strategy-free U.S. approach inadvertently encourages Taipei to ignore its declining negotiating leverage and rapidly diminishing ability to resist coercion from Beijing without invoking American intervention.? It makes Taiwan a disaster waiting to happen.? In effect, the United States has opted to ignore ever more adverse circumstances, deferring an explosion until actions by Taipei or decisions in Beijing eventually trigger one.? Recent moves by the Trump administration to bolster Taipei’s defiance of Beijing make such an explosion more, rather than less likely.

                The Taiwan issue is part of a larger unacknowledged problem in U.S. strategic interaction with China.? The People’s Republic is the only nuclear-armed great power whose frontiers are challenged by the United States. There are no established mechanisms for escalation control between Beijing and Washington.? Each has a record of misreading the other in times of crisis.? And, if Taiwan is the most plausible casus belli in a war neither side wants or can survive without grave damage, it is no longer the only possible trigger of Sino-American conflict.

                Both Taipei and Beijing regard the Senkaku (or Diaoyu / 釣魚) Islands – uninhabited and barren rocks in the East China Sea – as rightly part of Taiwan, though they are administered by Japan.? The modus vivendi that kept arguments over sovereignty from becoming a flash point between China and Japan collapsed in 2010.? The dispute now risks dragging Americans into a bloody rendezvous between Chinese and Japanese nationalism.

                In any conflict with China, the United States is committed to back Japan.? As in the case of Taiwan, exclusive reliance on military means – deterrence – to deal with the Senkaku dispute ensures that it is perpetuated rather than resolved.? There is no American diplomatic strategy for mitigating the risks of war over the issue, and no apparent thought of developing one.? Few Americans are aware of the issue.? Still fewer have considered the consequences that would flow from an accidental clash or a failure of deterrence.

                The year 2010 also marked the outbreak of escalating naval contention between China and the United States in the South China Sea.? China (including Taiwan) has long claimed islets, rocks, and reefs there.? Beijing did nothing to enforce its claims until rival claimants – Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam – began to do so.? It then grabbed whatever they had not, winding up with the least desirable landmasses in the Spratly Islands.? After some time, China enlarged these into artificial, fortified islands from which it cannot be dislodged.? Meanwhile, Beijing’s inability to muster an internal consensus on the basis and extent of its claims left both ambiguous.? This ensured that Americans and others would presume the worst, inadvertently embracing and acting to counter the most extreme positions advocated by Chinese chauvinists.

                The United States is not itself a counter-claimant to any territory claimed by China.? It has objected to several of China’s interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[13] ?If accepted, these Chinese assertions could restrict U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea.

                The initial confrontations between the two sides were over whether China could require prior notification or approval of military reconnaissance activities in its 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).? This argument faded away once China realized that it had an interest of its own in conducting such operations in other countries’ EEZs, including in U.S. waters.

                The concrete (as opposed to conjectural) point of difference between the Chinese and U/S. navies now concerns China’s use of straight baselines[14] to define the territorial seas around the archipelagoes and islands it controls.? The U.S. Navy has mounted frequent “freedom of navigation” operations (FONOPs) to challenge the Chinese practice.? But Washington has failed to articulate clear objectives for these operations, allowing the media to portray them as challenges to Chinese sovereignty rather than to how China exercises it.? Naval interactions in the South China Sea have become a test of wills, punctuated with emotional accusations by each side against the other.? Americans charge China with scofflaw behavior.? Chinese denounce what they see as an apparent U.S. effort to bully them.? There are no diplomatic processes in place to resolve either the territorial disputes among the various claimants or U.S. differences with China over the law of the sea.? Both sides are leaving it to might to make right.

                China’s presence in the South China Sea began as a response to the encroachment of other claimants on previously unenforced Chinese claims.? It has become a matter of strategic defense of the Chinese homeland that pits U.S. views of international law against Chinese security interests.? Two-thirds of the shipping in the South China Sea is on its way to or from China, giving China a huge stake in defending shipping against interdiction by foreign warships, e.g. the U, S. and Japanese navies in Taiwan or Senkaku contingencies.? The island bastions China has built in the Spratly Islands facilitate early warning, air and undersea surveillance operations, and the emplacement of land-based missiles to counter wartime foreign intrusions.

                Given the nationalist passion and self-righteousness now at play on both sides, it is hardly surprising that the specific issues at stake in China’s near seas have been subsumed in wider Sino-American rivalry.? The U.S. desire to continue to call the shots in the Western Pacific, as it has since World War II, now contends with the reality that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has already deployed many more warships off China’s shores than the U.S. has worldwide.[15] ?This quantitative gap is widening even as the quality and range of the PLAN’s weaponry approaches and, in some cases, exceeds the U.S. Navy’s.? Trends in the South China Sea now drive antagonisms that are broadening and going global.

                For many years, there was a striking disconnect between the increasingly contentious Sino-American military relationship and the growing interdependence of the two countries’ economies. Although it has a military dimension, China’s challenge to U.S. global primacy is mainly economic, not military or political.? (China’s international appeal, such as it is, does not derive from admiration for Leninism with Chinese characteristics.)? The perceived eclipse of American economic primacy by China played a role – though it was not the only factor – in the election of Donald J. Trump as president of the United States in 2016.

                President Trump is a mercantilist, with a view of economics that harks back to the era before David Ricardo (whose proof of “comparative advantage” was published in 1817).? Trump’s economic nationalism has led him to an obsession with bilateral rather than global trade balances, a preference for “managed” rather than free trade, an effort to protect the U.S. industrial base through reviews of both inbound and outbound investments based on their presumed implications for U.S. technological leadership, unilateral withdrawal from both plurilateral and multilateral institutions of international economic governance, and reduced immigration.? To realize this vision, he has launched a war on trade and investment with China (as well as all other significant U.S. trading partners).

                Links between American and Chinese businesses have long provided the ballast keeping Sino-American relations on an even keel.? Trump’s trade wars aim to alter the terms of trade and investment so that economic cooperation through supply chains is succeeded by antagonism.? Some of his advisors see this as fostering national economic self-sufficiency in the United States.?? (Of course, it will also promote self-reliance and sufficiency in China and could transform what had been “ballast” for the relationship into deadweight that drowns jobs and businesses in both countries.)? There is no clear path to a negotiated retreat from economic conflict on either side.

                The American position is an incoherent blend of unrelated and mutually incompatible demands – the foreign policy equivalent of a haggis.[16]? Some on the Trump team want to crush China’s economic model.? Others want to punish it for alleged transgressions against the intellectual property of American companies.? Still others want the two governments to manage trade to ensure that U.S. imports do not exceed U.S. exports to China.? There are those who seek the full opening of China’s financial sector.? Many see a halt in Chinese investment in the United States and to American investment in high-tech enterprises in China as essential to preserve American leadership in science and technology, especially as it relates to weaponry.

                China has been unable to make sense of this fantastic American blend of baneful demands.? But Chinese negotiators are concerned that, were they to accommodate one or more of them, the proponents of competing theses would sabotage any deal because it had not addressed their particular agendas.? Chinese officials are left to hope that, as Mr. Trump has done in the past, he will seize on minor concessions to declare a preposterous victory.? But, were he to do so with China, the president would risk embarrassing revolts by disgruntled members of his notoriously fractious entourage, some of whom have long favored all-out confrontation with Beijing.

                There are those on the Chinese side who, similarly, see political advantage in confrontation with the United States.? It is a handy excuse to drag their feet on economic reform, undercut American ideological influence in China, favor Chinese over foreign companies, indigenize science and technology, and diversify China’s international relationships to reduce reliance on the United States in favor of cooperation with Russia and other less politically erratic and demanding foreign partners.? The prospects for a fruitful end to Trump’s economic warfare against China do not look good.? It is more likely to prove counterproductive in terms of its objectives than to succeed – stimulating Chinese innovation, self-sufficiency, defense spending, and global economic influence while accelerating the decline of science and technology in the United States, impoverishing it, and reducing its role in global governance.

                Even if there is some sort of deal struck, economic truculence has now joined military antagonism as an engine of Sino-American hostility. ?As China takes advantage of America’s alienation of its foreign allies, partners, and friends, we can expect political antipathy to intensify.? It’s hard to think of any country anywhere that will not wish to avoid entanglement in long-term Sino-American confrontation.? Even regional rivals of China, like India and Japan, see a need to work with Beijing to advance common interests.? They do not want the United States to impose its own problems with China on theirs (or China to impose an anti-American agenda on them).? No nation is now willing to be forced, Cold War-style, into allegiance to one hyperpower against another.

                The 21st century is increasingly characterized by entente rather than alliance, ad hoc coalition rather than broad partnership, and transactional rather than relational commitments to cooperation.? By failing to adapt to these post-Cold War realities, Washington is placing its century-old economic primacy in jeopardy. ?There is no discernable support abroad for the U.S. repudiation of multilateralism in favor of aggressive unilateralism, whether political, economic, or military. There is widening resentment of perceived American abuses of inherited privilege through acts of omission as well as commission.

                The United States’ increasing resort to unilateral sanctions based on dollar sovereignty incentivizes others, including major U.S. allies, to find ways to avoid transactions in dollars.[17]? A dollar-free monetary system would protect their companies from extraterritorial punishment by the U.S. Treasury.? It would also weaken American dominance of global governance.? Building such an alternative system is a project that will draw active support from China, India, and Russia as well as the E.U. (which, on September 12, 2018, committed itself to this objective).[18]? ?It has a good chance of eventually knocking the props out from under the “exorbitant privilege” the U.S. has enjoyed through its unilateral control of the global medium of exchange.

                The world to come promises to be one in which the United States no longer enjoys many of the advantages to which it has been accustomed: lessened prestige and ability to inspire foreign nations to follow it, declining centrality to global finance and commerce; a greatly diminished role in global governance; and fewer alliances and partnerships to magnify and extend its military capabilities. ?The U.S. will have few, if any allies willing to join it in the event of a war with China over Taiwan or the South China Sea.? It will also be alone in its intervention in support of Japan in the event of an accidental outbreak of conflict in the Senkaku Islands.

                For its part, Beijing has no allies.? It has always seen them as unnecessary liabilities rather than assets.? Despite a growing partnership with Russia, China seeks to acquire enough power to balance America both economically and militarily on its own.? In a universe of transactionalism and à la carte relationships, the relevant questions are whether each country will be able to find partners on specific issues and who these will be.? Meanwhile, the U.S. withdrawal from both plurilateral and multilateral arrangements leaves the United States and China with no obvious ways to cooperate in setting the global agenda or its rules, managing worldwide challenges like climate change, or settling disputes through processes that limit bilateral confrontation.

                Ideology, including religion, inhibits Realpolitik but does not prevent it.? We have entered an age of unrealism.? Diplomacy shows every sign of devolving toward cynical patterns of pre-Enlightenment statecraft in which values count only to the extent they can be exploited to charge interests with energy.? This is a world in which self-discipline and mental rather than military agility will be the major determinants of events.? China has fewer vested interests to overcome as it adjusts to change than the United States.

                The new world disorder is an ecosystem in which no established alignments can be taken for granted.? China’s “belt and road” initiative has the potential to reengineer not just the Eurasian but the global economy and China’s role in both.? Middle-ranked powers like Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey occupy strategic positions that enable them to reorient themselves internationally.? They are gaining bargaining power vis-à-vis both China and the United States. So are Japan and NATO members.? Strategically stranded countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Ukraine can and will offer temporary fealty to foreign powers willing to back their regional agendas.? Nothing will be true, and everything will be possible.[19]

                Over the forty years that followed the Carter and Deng decisions of December 1978, China and the United States developed a relationship of cooperation within which competition could take place without significant adverse consequences.? That relationship is being succeeded by one of malicious coexistence, in which the two sides must find ways to transcend antagonism that permit ad hoc cooperation and limit conflict.?? In a sense, despite the huge growth in interdependence of markets, bureaucracies, companies, and individuals that has taken place, Beijing and Washington are conceptually back where they were before the Nixon opening of 1972: separated by ideological preconceptions and popular stereotypes uncorrected by any strategic rationale for collaboration in support of common interests, oblivious to the existence of such interests, and politically enjoined from exploring alternatives to military antagonism. ?They are again hostage to the decisions and actions of third parties like Taipei and Tokyo, Pyongyang and Seoul, Delhi and Islamabad, on peace and war between them.? But the international context is radically different, with Chinese power rising as that of the United States declines and China now in possession of assured means of devastating nuclear retaliation against any American threat to it.

                In this difficult context, the two must grapple with some of the same dilemmas they did forty years ago: how can they create a dynamic favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question?? What role should opposition or partnership with Russia play in their respective national security policies?? How can they revise the global and regional balances of power to limit the risks of conflict?? What relationships should each seek to develop to develop and sustain relationships with present and potential regional powers like India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Koreas?? Should they isolate or engage each other?

                There are new questions as well: how should China and the United States respond to nuclear and missile proliferation in South, West, and Northeast Asia?? How can they accommodate differing interpretations of international law, including the law of the sea?? What balance should each strike between exchanges of goods and services to boost prosperity and the relevance of technology to national security?? What reforms of institutions and practices would best address emerging challenges to global governance?? How are these to be funded or governed and by whom?

                This is a potent list of issues that the two countries can handle cooperatively or competitively.? What choices will each make?? What, if anything, might increase the prospects for mutually beneficial choices by both sides?

                Finally, the shifting balances of power and prestige impose a need for adjustments in U.S. policy.? In circumstances in which Chinese capabilities and clout are both rising relative to its own, is a confrontational approach by Washington more likely to induce cooperation or to entrench antagonism in Beijing?? Is leaving problems to future resolution, when China is more likely to be able to prevail on the battlefield, a wiser approach than trying to resolve them now, however difficult it might be to do so?? Should the United States seek to counter or benefit from the reality that all roads in Eurasia and adjacent areas will increasingly lead to Beijing?? What sorts of policies would opposition or support for China’s promotion of infrastructure connectivity entail, and where would the resources to implement such policies come from?? How can the United States reduce the danger that those to whom it has made defense commitments will do things that risk recklessly embroiling Americans in unwanted wars?? What nuclear deterrent posture and arms control policies are most likely to reduce the possibility of catastrophic damage to the American homeland from China as well as Russia?

                The absence of informed discussion of these issues in and between China and the United States is a clear and present danger to both as well as to others.? As the fortieth anniversary of their rapprochement nears, the two countries are badly in need of innovative strategic vision and statesmanship comparable to those they displayed in December 1978.? How China and the United States respond to this challenge will determine not only their own futures but the shape of the world to come.

                Bristol, Rhode Island, September 2018

                 

                [1] December 16 in Beijing.

                [2] http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30308

                [3] The Maoist slogan “People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!” immediately disappeared.? The assertion that “countries want independence, nations want liberation, the people want revolution” was heard no more.? And “we will certainly liberate Taiwan” was replaced with initiatives aimed at peaceful reunification with the island.

                [4][4] December 18 – 22, 1978 in Beijing.

                [5] “Agreements must be kept.”

                [6] Usually accompanied by repetitions of allegations about Chinese strategic objectives and behavior that have been repeated often enough to pose as axiomatic but by no new analysis or concrete evidence to back these assertions.

                [7] Often, it must be said, because of U.S. foot dragging.

                [8] ?http://articles.latimes.com/1994-05-27/news/mn-62877_1_human-rights.

                [9] The parallels between “democratic peace theory” and past hopes that Christians wouldn’t fight Christians, Muslims wouldn’t fight Muslims, and socialists wouldn’t fight socialists – none of which proved true — cry out for examination.? Count me skeptical, to say the least.

                [10] But the Chinese word used for “containment” is fundamentally misleading.? “遏制” does not accurately convey the sense of a policy of isolation intended to allow an enemy to do itself in through its own ideological rigidity and bureaucratic misdirection of resources.? But this very concept of allowing the Soviet warfare state to exhaust itself and die was the core of Kennan’s grand strategy of “containment.”? Applied to contemporary Sino-American relations, “containment,” as misunderstood, evokes Chinese fears that U.S. policy is directed at the strangulation of Chinese modernization rather than at balancing China’s growing power and deterring its possible abuse in bullying of others in the region.? To date, U.S. policy has sought both to engage China and to constrain its external behavior, not to isolate it, suppress it, or overthrow single-party rule in it.

                [11] Autarky is a system or policy of economic self-sufficiency aimed at removing the need for imports

                [12] https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/surprise-authoritarian-resilience-china/

                [13] Ironically, China has ratified the Convention, while the United States has not.? Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy has been accustomed to acting as the regulator of the global and regional maritime commons.? It has seen China’s emergence as a major, independent naval power as an unwelcome challenge to its primacy in the Western Pacific.

                [14] A baseline is a contour from which to measure the seaward limits of a state’s territorial sea.? Normally, a baseline follows the undulations of the low-water mark, but, when a coast is too deeply indented for a smooth contour to follow it, “straight baselines” can be drawn between its outermost points.? UNCLOS authorizes “archipelagic states” (countries that consist of one or more archipelagoes) to use straight in lieu of normal baselines.? China is not an archipelago.? It nonetheless uses straight baselines to enclose the archipelagoes it claims.? This enlarges the territorial seas it claims.? That is of concern to the U.S. Navy and others defending the existing order in the maritime commons.

                [15] As of 2018, the U.S. Navy deploys 280 vessels worldwide, 60–70 of which are assigned to the 7th Fleet, whose mission is the projection of U.S. power to the Indo-Pacific region.? The PLAN has about 280 deployable battle force ships plus another 200 or more missile and gunboats and 230 support vessels available to defend the approaches to the Chinese coast in support of what Americans term its “anti-access, area-denial” (A2/AD) strategy.? By 2020, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence forecasts that the PLAN will have 313 – 342 warships.

                [16] Those who have not encountered this signature creation of traditional Scottish cuisine may well hope they never do.? A haggis is a pudding made of the heart, liver, etc., of a sheep or calf, minced with suet and oatmeal, seasoned, and boiled in the stomach of the animal.

                [17] The most egregious case in point is the U.S. repudiation of its commitments under the Iran nuclear deal and its effort to strangle Iran’s foreign economic relations.? See the August 2018 remarks of German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas reporting on urgent efforts to end U.S. payments dominance, as reported by the Deutsche Welle at .

                [18] See President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker’s September 12, 2018 statement of resolve to turn the euro into a reserve currency to rival the dollar.? http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5724_en.htm.

                [19] Apologies to Peter Pomerantsev, whose excellent book of this title is about Russia but might as well be about the world of today as a whole.

                來源:昆侖策 2019年7月19日


                 

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